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THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY CAP ON
NONECONOMIC DAMAGES IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: IMPLICATIONS ON THE
RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Miller, a healthy and active eight year old, was admit-
ted to a California hospital for a routine tonsillectomy. However,
during the surgery Michael's vital signs became erratic and he
lapsed into a deep coma. When Michael awoke from the coma
twelve days later, it was determined that he had suffered severe, per-
manent neurological damage.
Michael and his parents subsequently brought a medical mal-
practice claim against the hospital, surgeon, and anesthesiologist.
During the course of the trial the jury heard and witnessed compel-
ling evidence pertaining to Michael's injuries. The expert testimony
indicated that the once bright child suffered a permanent impairment
of his motor and learning skills. While Michael's expected life span
of sixty-six years remained unaltered, it was concluded that he
would not develop intellectually or socially much beyond that of a
typical eight year old, and would require vigilant care for the re-
mainder of his life. The testimony further indicated that Michael's
brain damage also resulted in recurring, debilitating headaches, the
pain from which could be only minimally alleviated with available
treatment.
Following nine days of testimony and two days of deliberation,
the jury found the anesthesiologist negligent and held the hospital
vicariously liable. In addition to special damages covering the ex-
pected cost of Michael's medical care, the jury assessed Michael's
pain and suffering over his sixty-six remaining years and awarded
1.2 million dollars in noneconomic compensation. The trial judge
subsequently reduced the award for pain and suffering to $250,000
pursuant to state legislation that placed a ceiling on recovery for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claims.
Michael and his situation are fortunately hypothetical. How-
ever, the plight of many California medical malpractice plaintiffs
who have had their awards for pain and suffering reduced pursuant
1197
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to a state statute is neither fortunate nor hypothetical.'
The professional liability insurance crisis" of the last two de-
cades prompted all but one state to prescribe reform legislation
aimed at remedying the unmanageable insurance rates levied against
health care services.' California's legislative attempt to curtail the
crisis was the adoption of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA).' As part of this Act, the amount recoverable for
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claims was capped at
$250,000.' This statutory limit applies equally to all medical mal-
practice plaintiffs, regardless of life expectancy, the nature of the in-
jury, or the potential absence of substantial pecuniary loss.6 The
statute mandates that any jury award of noneconomic damages based
upon the jury's deliberations and conclusions of fact over the statu-
tory limit be reduced. The reduction is mandated even though the
jury's findings may be reasonably supported by the evidence as a
matter of law.
In 1985, the California Supreme Court decided Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group8 and upheld the statutory cap in the
face of equal protection and due process challenges.9 Although the
statute treats unequal plaintiffs equally,1" the majority deferred to
the legislature and applied the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. Hav-
1. See, e.g., Gilman v. Beverly California Corp., 283 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Ct. App. 1989)
(reducing plaintiff's wrongful death award for noneconomic damages to $250,000); Atkins v.
Strayhorn, 273 Cal. Rptr. 231 (Ct. App. 1990) (statutorily reducing medical malpractice
award to plaintiff whose leg was partially amputated due to medical negligence).
2. The medical malpractice insurance crisis is discussed infra in Part A of Section II.
3. See Ruth Gastel, Medical Malpractice, INS. INFO. INST. DATA BASE REP., Nov.
1991, at 7, (noting that only West Virginia has failed to enact reform legislation).
4. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). The statute provides that:
(A) In any action for injury against a health care provider based on per-
sonal negligence, the injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic
losses to compensate for pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment,
disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage.
(B) In no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses ex-
ceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000).
Id.
5. Id.
6. id.
7. Id. The statute contains no exceptions and the automatic reduction of an award in
excess of $250,000 to $250,000 is not contingent upon a legal finding that the jury's award was
excessive as a matter of law. Id.
8. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1986).
9. Id. at 684.
10. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992). The statute mandates that
awards in excess of $250,000 be lowered to that amount regardless of the severity of the plain-
tiff's injuries. Id.
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ing to satisfy only a rational relationship test, the statute was
upheld. 1
The majority of states that have considered similar statutes have
struck down the damage ceilings on equal protection and due process
theories.'" Several statutory caps on recovery have also been invali-
dated as unconstitutional infringements on the right to a jury trial."
Fein, however, remains the definitive statement of California law. 4
Additionally, two California courts of appeal have applied Fein in
specifically holding that the California statutory cap does not abridge
the constitutional right to a jury trial.'5
This comment argues that section 3333.2 of the California Civil
Code is unconstitutional on the theory that the statutory ceiling on
recovery denies medical malpractice plaintiffs the constitutional right
to a jury trial.
This comment in Section II will first discuss the medical mal-
practice crisis as the precipitating factor to California's enactment of
the damage cap provision in MICRA. It will then summarize Fein
and the holdings of other state and federal courts which have ad-
dressed the constitutionality of similar statutory caps on recovery in
light of the constitutional right to a jury. Section II will finally dis-
cuss the California and federal rights to a jury trial. Section III will
set forth the constitutional and practical problems associated with the
California statutory cap on economic recovery. Section IV will ana-
lyze the statutory cap, relevant constitutional provisions, and the rea-
soning of courts that have addressed the problem. Finally, a pro-
posed solution will be discussed in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Medical Malpractice Crisis and California's Response
The early 1970's witnessed the beginning of what is commonly
referred to as the medical malpractice crisis. 6 Many private insurers
11. Fein, 695 P.2d at 686.
12. See Ruth Gastel, Medical Malpractice, INS. INFO. INST. DATA BASE REP., Oct.
1990, at 5.
13. See Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989),
modified, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. App. 1989).
14. 695 P.2d at 665.
15. Jordan v. Long Beach Community Hosp., 248 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1988) (re-
view denied and ordered not to be officially published (Sept. 15, 1988)); Yates v. Pollock, 239
Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1987).
16. Gastel, supra note 3, at 7.
19921 1199
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
were compelled to leave the market due to increasing financial losses.
The insurance companies able to maintain their businesses did so at
the growing expense of health care providers and receivers. 17 While
many factors converged to cause the crisis, a central factor was the
growing number and dollar amounts of malpractice claims. The re-
sulting escalation in health care liability insurance rates not only af-
fected the care providers, but in turn impacted the availability of
affordable medical care. 8
There is some indication that the crisis is abating, yet concern
by the insurance companies, physicians, and the general population
persists. 9 Recent statistics indicate that the number of malpractice
claims is decreasing. However, the fewer number of claims continue
to result in larger awards."0 As of June 1989, the average insurance
cost per malpractice claim was more than $36,000, a four year in-
crease of about $8,000 per claim.2"
Physicians, generally, are justifiably concerned about this per-
sistent crisis."2 Their consistent response is that tort reforms are nec-
essary to abate rising costs and the consequential decline in available
services.2" Studies of these reforms, however, indicate that they will
only slightly affect the annual costs incurred from tort claims.2 ' The
American Medical Association (AMA) has estimated that increasing
liability costs of about twelve billion dollars constituted roughly fif-
teen percent of the net amount spent on health services in 1984.2" Of
this growing amount, nine billion was due to changes in physicians'
practices. These changes were typified by more expensive procedures
designed to minimize risk and potential liability. Charges by medical
malpractice insurance companies, however, constituted only three of
the twelve billion dollars annually spent on liability costs.2 6 These
numbers support recent studies which have found liability insurance
17. Gastel, supra note 3, at 7. The term "health care providers" refers to anyone associ-
ated with the rendering of medical services. "Receivers" are members of the public who obtain
medical care.
18. See, e.g., Gastel, supra note 3, at 8-9; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physician's Point of
View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Impor-
tance of Tort Reforms, 23 GA. L. REv. 295 (1989).
19. Gastel, supra note 3, at 1.
20. Gastel, supra note 3, at I.
21. Gastel, supra note 12, at 2-3.
22. Hubbard, supra note 18, at 296.
23. Hubbard, supra note 18, at 296.
24. Hubbard, supra note 18, at 296.
25. Gastel, supra note 12, at 8.
26. Gastel, supra note 12, at 8.
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premium costs to be less than "excessively high."2
Nonetheless, the overwhelming response by state legislatures
was to enact statutory tort reforms in the area of medical malpractice
claims.28 In California, the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act (MICRA) was enacted.29 The Act provides that noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice claims may not exceed $250,000.0
The statute does not limit damages recoverable for special dam-
ages,"1 but merely limits the amount plaintiffs may recover as a re-
sult of nonpecuniary loss.32 The statute applies equally to all medi-
cal malpractice plaintiffs with no exceptions. 8 Factors such as the
degree and nature of the injury, the life expectancy of the plaintiff,
or the reasonableness of the jury's findings of fact are not considered.
The statutory cap of $250,000 on such damages has remained un-
changed since its enactment over fifteen years ago.
34
B. Fein v. Permanente
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 5 the California Su-
preme Court heard arguments concerning the constitutionality of
section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code offered by a malpractice
plaintiff whose award was reduced by the trial court in accordance
with the statute. 6 The plaintiffs complaint alleged, and the jury
found, that the Permanente Medical Group was negligent in its fail-
ure to properly and promptly diagnose plaintiffs heart condition and
eventual heart attack. The jury determined plaintiffs noneconomic
damages, including pain and suffering, to be $500,000. Pursuant to
the statute, the award was reduced by the trial judge to $250,000." 7
27. Hubbard, supra note 18, at 296. The studies concluded that the " 'crisis' " in mal-
practice insurance has abated, and that premiums are not unmanageable. Id.
28. Gastel, supra note 3, at 7.
29. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
30. Id.
31. Special damages are those losses actually suffered by a plaintiff. They typically flow
directly from an injury, such as medical bills or lost wages. Special damages generally have to
be specifically pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (6th ed.
1990).
32. "Nonpecuniary damages" encompass injuries suffered by a plaintiff that are not
based in direct monetary loss. Nonpecuniary losses may include pain, suffering, and loss of
consortium. For a definition of "pecuniary damages," see id.
33. However, the statutory ceiling on recovery applies only to actions involving profes-
sional negligence, and does not apply to a patient's battery action against a health care pro-
vider. Szkorla v. Vecchione, 283 Cal. Rptr. 219 (Ct. App. 1991).
34. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1990 & Supp. 1992).
35. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
36. Id.
37. Fein, 695 P.2d at 671.
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The plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the statute on
equal protection and due process grounds.38 No mention was made
of the statute's impact on the right to trial by jury under the state
constitution. In analyzing the constitutional challenges, the court ap-
plied a mere rational relationship test.39 In justifying the use of this
test, the court reasoned that since the statute constituted economic
legislation and did not involve a suspect class or fundamental right,
considerable deference should be given to legislative determinations
regarding the need and efficacy of the statutory cap."' The court
found that "[tihe choice between reasonable alternative methods for
achieving a given objective is generally for the Legislature, and there
are a number of reasons why the Legislature may have made the
choices it did." '41 For a statute to withstand a rational relationship
test, the court must merely find that there is a legitimate state inter-
est and that the means are rationally related to that purpose. The
court appeared to have little difficulty in determining that the state's
interest in maintaining reasonable liability insurance rates and en-
suring adequate medical care for the public was legitimate.4 The
court also found the statutory cap to be rationally related to achiev-
ing that end.43 The statute was therefore held to be constitutional
and the limit on plaintiff's noneconomic recovery was sustained.44
C. Statutory Damage Ceilings and the Right to Trial by Jury
As of October 1990, fifteen state supreme courts have addressed
the constitutionality of damage cap provisions similar to section
3333.2 of the California Civil Code. 5 Eleven of these courts have
38. Id. at 679, 682.
39. Id. at 679-81. The "rational relationship test" is simply the term used to describe a
court's level of judicial scrutiny in analyzing a statute. The "rational relationship test" is the
least rigorous form of scrutiny. To satisfy the test, statutes must typically merely regard a
legitimate state interest and be rationally related to that interest. See, e.g., Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
40. Fein, 695 P.2d at 679, 683. The court reasoned that since the class of medical mal-
practice plaintiffs whose jury awards are reduced pursuant to the statute has not been tradi-
tionally discriminated against and is not without political power, they do not constitute a sus-
pect class. The court also concluded that the right to have an award in excess of the statutory
limit was not fundamental. Given the absence of a suspect class and fundamental right, a mere
rational relationship test was applied. Id. (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
Hosp., 683 P.2d 670, 696 (Cal. 1984)).
41. Id. at 683.
42. Id. at 681-82.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 684.
45. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Condemarin v. University
Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp. 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989);
1202 [Vol. 32
1992] NONECONOMIC DAMAGES 1203
struck down the laws as unconstitutional." A handful of these stat-
utes were held unconstitutional not because they violated equal pro-
tection and due process as urged by the plaintiffs in Fein,4 but as a
result of their impact on the state right to a trial by jury."
1. State Courts Holding Damage Caps Unconstitutional as
an Infringement on the State Right to Trial by Jury
The supreme courts of Washington, Texas, and Utah invali-
dated legislative attempts to place ceilings on tort damage recoveries
as unreasonable infringements of the right to trial by jury.
The Supreme Court of Washington recently heard Sofie v.
Fibreboard,49 a case in which the plaintiffs challenged the constitu-
tionality of a statute that limited recovery for noneconomic damages
in all personal injury and wrongful death actions."0 The plaintiffs
received a judgment against an asbestos manufacturer, only to have
the award decreased by over a million dollars by the trial court.51
Although the plaintiffs argued that the statute violated equal protec-
tion, due process, and the right to trial by jury, the court held the
statute unconstitutional as an impermissible interference with the
state right to a jury trial, and therefore never reached the merits of
the equal protection or due process claims."2
In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that the Sev-
Gastel, supra note 12, at 5. Courts in California, Indiana, Wyoming, Kansas, Florida, Ne-
braska, Louisiana, Idaho, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Utah, and
Washington have addressed the constitutionality of statutory damage caps. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d
at 689; Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 362.
46. Condemarin, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989); Gastel, supra note 12, at 5. Courts in
Idaho, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Kansas, Wyoming, Florida, Ohio, Texas,
Utah, and Washington have held the caps unconstitutional. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 361.
47. 695 P.2d at 679-84.
48. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988); Condemarin, 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989);
Sofie, 775 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
49. 771 P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989), modified, 780 P.2d 260 (Wash. App. 1989).
50. Id. at 713. The statutory cap at issue provides in part that:
(2) In no action seeking damages for personal injury or death may a claim-
ant recover a judgment for noneconomic damages exceeding arn amount deter-
mined by multiplying 0.43 by the average annual wage and by the life expec-
tancy of the person incurring noneconomic damages, as the life expectancy is
determined by the life expectancy tables adopted by the insurance commissioner.
For purposes of determining the maximum amount allowable for noneconomic
damages, a claimant's life expectancy shall not be less than fifteen years. The
limitation contained in this subsection applies to all claims for noneconomic
damages made by a claimant who incurred bodily injury.
Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 712-13.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
enth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not apply to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment." Using Seventh Amend-
ment analysis as mere analogy, the court struck down the statute "on
adequate and independent state grounds."5 ' Article 1, section 21 of
the Washington State Constitution mandates that the right to a jury
trial "shall remain inviolate."" The court then proceeded through
an analysis of the common law functions and features of the jury. It
found clear evidence that the jury's functions at common law in-
cluded the ascertaining of damages." The United States Supreme
Court has approved of such an historical analysis to determine the
parameters of the right to a jury trial, and in the same case noted
that particular deference should be given to the jury when its task
includes the assessment of noneconomic damages.'"
In recognizing the constitutional and common law right to a
jury trial, the court also recognized the power of the legislature to
shape particular causes of action." It concluded, however, that con-
temporary legislative vehicles which operate to alter a jury's verdict
do not exceed constitutional limits, as does the statutory ceiling on
noneconomic recovery." Referring to the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Dimick v. Schiedt,'0 the court embraced the notion that the
continuing interest of litigants in their constitutional right to a jury
trial cannot be limited by the legislature. While the legislature may
have the capacity to do away with particular causes of action, if a
particular civil action exists, the litigant must have the right to have
a jury decide the factual issues of the case. 61
With regard to the statutory limitation on damage recovery, the
court found that the statute impermissibly removes from the jury the
right to make findings of fact by modifying such findings to a "pre-
determined formula", even if the findings were reasonable as a mat-
ter of law.' The Sofie majority drew the comparison between the
statute at issue in that case, and the several statutes from other states
53. Id. at 717.
54. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 717.
55. Id. at 721.
56. Id. at 717.
57. Id. (citing Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 479 (1935)).
58. Id. at 719.
59. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 720-21. The court concluded that neither remittitur nor
mandatory arbitration laws surpassed constitutional requirements. Id.
60. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935). This case is discussed in depth in Part 3 of
Section II.
61. Sofie v. Fibreboard, 771 P.2d 711, 720 (Wash. 1989), modified, 780 P.2d 260
(Wash. App. 1989).
62. Id.
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which limit noneconomic recovery in medical malpractice cases. 8
The court noted that none of the states which have upheld such laws
considered the implication to the right to a jury trial. Specifically, the
court noted that the court in Fein did not address the jury issue, even
though the Washington and California state constitutional provisions
regarding jury trials are very similar."
The Supreme Court of Texas, in Lucas v. U.S., 6 struck down
a statutory provision similar to California Civil Code section 3333.2
on grounds pertaining to the right to trial by jury and due process.66
The plaintiffs in Lucas were a fourteen month old boy and his par-
ents. They alleged, and the court found, that the child's legs had
become paralyzed as a result of a negligently administered injection
of penicillin. 6 7 The trial court awarded the plaintiffs 1.5 million dol-
lars for pain and suffering. Like the plaintiffs in Fein, the Lucas
plaintiffs' award was subsequently lowered in accordance with the
Texas statute." The Supreme Court of Texas found the damage cap
provision to be unconstitutional under both due process and right to
jury trial theories."
The Texas court concluded that the state constitutional right to
a jury developed in that state was violated by the damage cap provi-
sion." The majority reasoned that the state constitutional guarantee
of access to the courts was intertwined with the right to trial by jury,
and neither could be impermissibly hindered by the legislature." Ac-
cess to open courts, the court observed, exists for the purpose of rem-
edying injuries. However, "[a] plaintiff who receives a jury verdict
for one million dollars, has not received a constitutional redress of
injuries if the legislature statutorily, and arbitrarily caps the recov-
ery."7  The plaintiff in such a situation is also being denied the con-
stitutional right of a jury trial."
63. Id. at 722-25.
64. Id. at 723. Both state constitutions describe the state constitutional right to trial by
jury as "inviolate". Id. at 721.
65. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988).
66. Id. at 690.
67. Id. at 688.
68. Id. at 688-89. The Texas statutory cap provides "[in an action on a health care
liability claim where final judgment is rendered against a physician or health care provider,
the limit of civil liability for damages of the physician or health care provider shall be limited
to an amount not to exceed 3500,000." Id.
69. Id. at 690.
70. Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 692.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Smith v. Dep't of Insurance, 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987)).
73. Id.
120519921
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The court ended its analysis by recognizing the legislature's in-
terest in attempting to alleviate health care problems. Such an inter-
est, however, could not justify the denial of individual rights which
necessarily accompany even the most benign statutory damage cap
provision."'
The Supreme Court of Utah, in Condemarin v. University
Hospital," likewise invalidated statutory caps on noneconomic re-
covery following an analysis of the jury issues.7 The plaintiffs in
Condemarin alleged that their physician had negligently performed
a cesarean section resulting in neurological damage to their new-
born infant. The doctor and his employer hospital were held liable,
but the damages were limited to $100,000 by the trial court pursuant
to the Utah damage cap statute.7
The Utah Supreme Court began its analysis of the statute by
noting that the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Utah State
Constitution is "deeply rooted in our basic democratic traditions and
so important in the administration of justice, not only as a buffer
between the state and the sovereign citizens of the state, but also as a
means for rendering justice between citizens."'7' The court went on
to find that statutory ceilings on recovery significantly mitigate the
historical function of the jury in setting damages. Such a substantial
infringement upon a constitutional guarantee compelled the court to
find the legislative action and statute invalid.7"
2. State Courts Sustaining Damage Caps Against
Constitutional Right to Jury Challenges
Contrary to Washington, Texas, and Utah, statutory ceilings on
noneconomic recovery have been sustained in the face of challenges
pertaining to the right to a jury trial by courts of appeal in Califor-
nia and by the Supreme Courts of Kansas and Virginia.
A California court of appeal, in Yates v. Pollock, specifically
addressed the California statutory cap's impact on the medical mal-
practice plaintiffs right to a jury trial. 80 The plaintiffs in Yates suc-
cessfully sued a surgeon for the wrongful death of Charles Yates
74. Id. at 690.
75. Condemarin v. University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989).
76. Id. at 366.
77. Id. at 348. The statutory cap at issue limited the total amount of recovery to
$100,000. Id.
78. Id. at 365.
79. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366.
80. 239 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1987).
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from the surgeon's malpractice.8" The plaintiffs were awarded $1.5
million in economic damages."
Upon the surgeon's appeal, the court concluded that the statu-
tory cap on economic damages applied to wrongful death actions."
The court also rejected the plaintiff's contention that the damage cap
provision unconstitutionally stifled the right to a jury trial. 4 While
observing the absence of case law immunizing noneconomic damages
from legislative limitation," the court quoted from Fein in conclud-
ing that "the Legislature retains broad control over the measure, as
well as the timing, of damages that a defendant is obligated to pay
and a plaintiff is entitled to receive, and that [it] may expand or limit
recoverable damages so long as its action is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."" The plaintiffs' award was subsequently
reduced pursuant to the statutory ceiling.8"
One year after Yates, a court of appeal in the same district simi-
larly upheld the legislative damage cap against the plaintiff's claim
that their right to a jury trial was infringed by the cap. 8
In Jordan, the husband and wife plaintiffs sued the husband's
surgeon for medical malpractice and loss of consortium." The jury
concluded that the surgeon's removal of Mr. Jordan's healthy left
kidney, instead of his cancerous right kidney, constituted malprac-
tice, and awarded Mr. and Mrs. Jordan $4.5 million, and $625,000
respectively, in noneconomic damages.9" The award was subse-
quently reduced by the trial court to $250,000 pursuant to
MICRA.91
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that the $250,000 cap encum-
bered their constitutional right to a jury trial.92 The court of appeal,
however, simply referred to Fein and quoted from Yates, concluding
that Yates correctly stated California law on the issue.9" Conse-
81. Id. at 384.
82. Id. at 384 n.j.
83. Id. at 385.
84. Id. at 385-86.
85. Yates, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
86. Id. at 385-86 (quoting Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal.
1985), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1986)) (alteration in original).
87. Id. at 386.
88. Jordan v. Long Beach Community Hosp., 248 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1988) (re-
view denied and ordered not to be officially published (Sept. 15, 1988)).
89. Id. at 653.
90. id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 654.
93. Jordan, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
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quently, the Jordan court echoed Yates in recognizing the broad au-
thority of the legislature to limit damages, and summarily rejected
the plaintiffs constitutional argument. 9
In a recent case," the Kansas Supreme Court abandoned the
rationale of an earlier decision" that statutory caps on recovery vio-
lated a plaintiff's right to trial by jury.97 In Samsel v. Wheeler
Transport Services," the court recognized that the common law
function of a jury includes the determination of damages in a per-
sonal injury claim."' However, the court reasoned that a plaintiff
does not have a vested right in any common law cause of action, and
the legislature may therefore limit the right to a jury trial on partic-
ular claims if it provides an adequate quid pro quo. 00
The plaintiff in Samsel was paralyzed as a result of an auto
accident which the trial court determined was negligently caused by
the defendant driver.10 A Kansas statute capped damages in all per-
sonal injury actions for pain and suffering at $250,000.'' In analyz-
ing the plaintiff's claim that the statutory ceiling on recovery was
unconstitutional, the Kansas Supreme Court noted the traditional
parameters of the right to a jury trial and the legislature's role in
setting those boundaries.' 03 The court reasoned that since a litigant
does not have a vested right in any particular common law rule ap-
plicable to negligence actions, the legislature may modify those rules
as long as due process requirements are satisfied.' 4 The Kansas
court concluded that due process merely required that the legislature
act reasonably in the promotion of the general welfare, and that it
offer litigants a sufficient quid pro quo for the loss of the right.' 08
Regarding the general welfare, the court had little difficulty
94. Id.
95. Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990), overruled on other
grounds by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991).
96. Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988), overruled
by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991).
97. Id.
98. 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d
1176 (Kan. 1991).
99. Id. at 556.
100. Id. at 557. "Quid pro quo" is translated as "what for what." BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990).
101. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 548.
102. Id. The statutory cap on recovery at issue provides that: "(b) In any personal
injury action, the total amount recoverable by each party from all defendants for all claims for
... noneconomic loss shall not exceed a sum total of $250,000." Id.
103. Id. at 556-57.
104. Id. at 557.
105. Id.
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concluding that the statutory cap was reasonable and in the public
interest as a means of abating insurance costs.106 The court then ra-
tionalized that the provision mandating that a verdict in excess of
$250,000 be lowered to that amount assured the plaintiff that her
award would not be lowered below $250,000.107 Since the trial judge
would have discretion to lower an award below $250,000 if the stat-
ute did not exist, such an assurance served as an adequate quid pro
quo. 08 The Kansas Supreme Court subsequently denied plaintiff's
challenge and sustained the statutory cap.109
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Etheridge v. Medi-
cal Center Hospitals'" sustained the validity of Virginia's statutory
cap on noneconomic damages in malpractice claims.11 The plaintiffs
challenged the statute as a violation of the state constitutional right
to a jury trial." 2 In rejecting plaintiffs' challenge, the Etheridge
court recognized that a traditional function of the jury as factfinder is
the determination of damages." The court, however, made the dis-
tinction between the legal consequences of a finding of fact and the
actual finding itself."" The majority reasoned that once the jury has
made its findings as to a plaintiff's damages, its constitutional func-
tion is complete."' In other words, the jury only determines the
quantum of a plaintiff's injuries. It has not traditionally been, nor
should it be, responsible for compelling that the determined amount
of compensation be paid. The court subsequently rejected plaintiffs'
challenge and upheld the statutory cap on recovery. 6
3. Federal Courts and State Statutory Caps in Light of the
Seventh Amendment
State statutory ceilings on damage recovery potentially fall
within the jurisdiction of the federal, as well as state, constitutions.
To date, two federal district courts and one circuit court of appeals
have addressed the constitutionality of state statutory cap provisions
106. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 557-58.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 526-27.
113. Id. at 529.
114. Id.
115. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
116. Id.
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in light of the Seventh Amendment 117 and contemporaneous state
constitutional provisions. Although the Seventh Amendment is not
binding on the states, federal jurisprudence concerning the right to a
jury is beneficial in assessing the right to a jury trial under a partic-
ular state constitution.
In Boyd v. Bulala,"' the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Virginia was faced with the same Virginia statute which
was later interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court in Ether-
idge." 9 The plaintiffs in Boyd were an infant and her parents who
alleged that their physician negligently failed to provide adequate
care during labor and delivery resulting in the infant's suffering se-
vere physical and mental handicaps. 2 ° The seven member jury re-
turned verdicts for the plaintiffs totaling more than $8 million dol-
lars.' The defendant then moved to have the award reduced to
$750,000 as directed by the Virginia statute.'22
In assessing defendant's motion, the district court initially found
that the Virginia state right to a jury trial was contemporaneous
with the Seventh Amendment right.' Applying an historical analy-
sis, the court concluded that under both constitutions the traditional
function of the jury includes the determination of damages. Since the
statutory cap on damages constricts the jury's capacity to fully assess
damages, it is unconstitutional under the Virginia Constitution. 4
The court concluded that although the legislature may legislate the
manner in which a jury makes factual findings, "the legislature may
not preempt a jury's findings on a factual issue which has properly
been submitted to the jury."'2 5 Statutory caps therefore invade not
only the province of the jury, but are similarly an unjust encroach-
ment on the judicial branch.' 2 6
The district court's opinion in Boyd was not binding for long.
Shortly after Boyd was decided, the Virginia Supreme Court upheld
the state statutory cap on damages in Etheridge.2 The Fourth Cir-
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
118. Boyd v. Bulali, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986), modified, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th
Cir. 1989).
119. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
120. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 781.
121. Id. at 784.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 789.
124. Id. at 789-90.
125. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 789-90.
126. Id. at 790.
127. Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
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cuit Court of Appeals heard Boyd's appeal after the Virginia Su-
preme Court decided Etheridge. The circuit court subsequently re-
versed the district court and deferred to the state supreme court's
holding.128 The circuit court held that the Etheridge decision, inter-
preting the state constitutional right to a jury trial, was binding on
the federal court.1 9 It also held that since the Virginia constitutional
right to a jury trial and the Seventh Amendment were coextensive,
the state statutory cap did not offend the Seventh Amendment. "
The rationale was the same as that given by the Etheridge court as
to why the state constitutional right was not violated. " '
Finally, a federal district court in Maryland, in Franklin v.
Mazda Corp.," 2 denied constitutional challenges to a Maryland
statutory cap on noneconomic damages."' The plaintiff in Franklin
alleged that she suffered personal injuries and pain and suffering as
a result of defendant's strict liability." The plaintiff also filed a
motion for a declaratory judgment claiming that the Maryland statu-
tory cap on noneconomic recovery was unconstitutional as an in-
fringement on the federal and state constitutional rights to a jury
trial."
In discerning plaintiff's motion, the district court began its anal-
ysis by noting that the jury provisions in the Maryland and U.S.
Constitutions were coextensive. It then concluded that the statutory
cap did not involve the legislature as a factfinder in a legal contro-
versy, but was instead a proper measure of legislative control over
causes of action and the types of damages which may be recovered."'
The court therefore found the statutory cap on noneconomic recovery
to be constitutionally sound, and plaintiffs motion for declaratory
judgment was denied." 7
D. The Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
The Seventh Amendment and various state constitutional provi-
128. Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1989).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1196.
131. Id.
132. Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Md. 1989).
133. Id. at 1335. The statutory cap at issue provided that "[iln any action for damages
for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after July 1, 1986, an award for
noneconomic damages may not exceed $350,000." Id. at 1327 (alteration in original).
134. Id. at 1326-27.
135. Id. at 1327.
136. Id. at 1330-33.
137. Id.
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sions regarding the state right to a jury trial are generally believed to
be equal in scope. While the Seventh Amendment is not binding on
the states, federal jurisprudence concerning the right to trial by jury
nonetheless casts light on state constitutional jury provisions.
1. The California Constitution
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution" 8 states that
the right to a jury trial is inviolate, and shall be secured to all.139 In
interpreting this provision, California courts have recognized the his-
torical and contemporary importance of the state right to a trial by
jury. 140
Outside of the medical malpractice context, the California Su-
preme Court in Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines1 41 considered
an appeal from a judgment for a plaintiff who was injured while
boarding one of defendant's buses."4 ' The plaintiff was severely in-
jured as a result of being caught in the bus doors as they suddenly
closed, and being dragged for some distance outside the bus. 4 The
plaintiff was awarded over $187,000, of which $134,000 was allo-
cated for pain and suffering.' 44
In rejecting the defendant's assertion that the damages were ex-
cessive, the court noted that "[tihe amount of damages is a fact ques-
tion, first committed to the discretion of the jury and next to the
discretion of the trial judge on a motion for a new trial.""1 The
court subsequently concluded that a jury's conclusion as factfinder
must be afforded great weight, and that the plaintiff's award should
not be disturbed. 46
In Byram v. Superior Court," a California court of appeal
maintained that "[tihe right to trial by jury is a basic and fundamen-
tal part of our system of jurisprudence.""'14 As a result, it should be
vigorously safeguarded, and any doubt as to its applicability should
138. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
139. Id.
140. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1077
(1977); Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961); Byram v. Superior
Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Ct. App. 1977).
141. 364 P.2d 337 (Cal. 1961).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 339.
144. Id. at 342.
145. Id.
146. Seffert, 364 P.2d at 342.
147. 141 Cal. Rptr. 604 (Ct. App. 1977).
148. Id. at 607.
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be resolved in favor of maintaining a party's right to trial by jury." 9
In light of this strong presumption in favor of a litigant's right to a
jury, the court ordered the trial court to grant plaintiff's motion for
relief from his earlier waiver of a jury trial in his personal injury
action.150
The California Supreme Court embraced the analysis of the
Byram court. In People v. Collins,'5 1 the court addressed the histori-
cal role of the jury and its relation to legislative powers. The plain-
tiff in Collins appealed his conviction of first degree robbery, claim-
ing that the substitution of an alternate juror after jury deliberations
began compromised his right to a jury trial." In addressing the ap-
peal, the state supreme court emphasized that the state right to a
jury trial was inviolate. In discerning the parameters of this right,
one must look at how it existed at common law. The court concluded
that the right to a jury trial, which has been held to include the
capacity of the jury to determine damages, may not be abridged by
any legislative enactment." While the court recognized that the leg-
islature may enact reasonable regulations of the enjoyment of this
right, the fundamental elements of the jury trial as they existed at
common law must be preserved and secured to all. Although the
court sustained the petitioner's conviction, it held that it was an error
for the trial court not to instruct the jury to begin deliberations again
with the new juror. '54
2. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial
The analysis of the right to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment is very similar to state constitutional provisions.
The Seventh Amendment15 5 states that the "right of trial by jury
shall be preserved." 15 6 The use of the term "preserved," and the
Amendment's inclusion in the Bill of Rights, certainly provide evi-
dence of the framers' conception of this right. It was established as
an individual guarantee against encroachment upon individual liber-
ties by the state, as were all the Bill of Rights. 5
149. Id.
150. Id. at 608.
151. 552 P.2d 742 (Cal. 1976).
152. Id. at 744.
153. Id. at 745.
154. Id.
155. U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
156. Id.
157. See Paul B. Weiss, Comment, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the
Seventh Amendment?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 746 (1989).
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However, unlike most of the individual liberties contained in
the Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court has not directly indicated
what functions of the jury are to be preserved." As was done in the
state constitutional analysis, one must look to what essential jury
functions existed at common law to determine which functions must
be preserved.
In Dimick v. Schiedt,"' the U.S. Supreme Court used an his-
torical analysis to determine whether additur violated the Seventh
Amendment. The Court found that determining damages, as an issue
of fact, was within the jury's province and protected by the Seventh
Amendment.1 0 The Court also maintained that "any seeming cur-
tailment of t he right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the
utmost care." 16 The Court consequently found that additur was not
allowed in federal courts since it infringed on the federal right to a
jury trial.1 62
Some, however, maintain that the above analysis in Dimick has
since been overruled by the Supreme Court in Tull v. United
States. "s Using the same historical analysis as in Dimick, the Tull
Court found that in a proceeding under the Federal Clean Water
Act, a defendant has the right to a jury trial but not the right to have
the jury assess the civil penalty." 4
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The California statutory ceiling on noneconomic recovery in
medical malpractice claims raises several constitutional and equitable
questions. States that have considered the validity of similar statutes
have both upheld and struck down the statutes on equal protection,
due process and right to trial by jury constitutional theories. 6
While California Civil Code section 3333.2'60 appears to unfairly
place the burden of maintaining reasonable medical liability insur-
ance rates on the very persons most severely injured as a result of
professional negligence, the statute has nonetheless been upheld
against equal protection and due process challenges. 6
158. Id.
159. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
160. d. at 485-86.
161. Id. at 486.
162. Id.
163. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
164. d. at 427.
165. See supra part II.C.
166. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992).
167. Id. The statutory cap on recovery, while applicable to all medical malpractice
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The California statutory cap has not, however, been scrutinized
by the California Supreme Court as a possible impairment on the
constitutional right to trial by jury. State and federal courts which
have analyzed statutory caps on damages have reached conflicting
conclusions.168 The remainder of this comment synthesizes the argu-
ments and holdings of courts which have invalidated statutory caps
as an infringement on the right to a trial by jury. The justifications
offered by courts which have upheld such statutes in the face of jury
related challenges are rebutted and distinguished. The subsequent
conclusion is that California Civil Code section 3333.2 should be in-
validated as an impermissible infringement on the constitutional
right to a jury trial. Finally, the status of the California Supreme
Court's decision in Fein will be assessed in light of the statutory
cap's impact on the right to a jury trial.
The future status of the California statutory ceiling on recovery
for noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claims is certainly
significant to anyone with an interest in the state of health care. This
includes liability insurance companies and health care providers, as
well as the recipients of medical care. If the statutory cap is invali-
dated as unconstitutional, the potential impact on liability insurance
rates and the resulting availability of medical services are certainly
concerns that must be addressed. 6 Opponents of tort reform will be
given the opportunity to study the effect of such reforms on insur-
ance rates, and perhaps illustrate that insurance rates remain the
same, irrespective of the presence of statutory caps. Proponents of
such reforms will be burdened with the necessity of advocating re-
forms which are not offensive to the constitution.
Perhaps no one will be impacted more by the invalidation of the
statutory cap than the class of severely injured medical malpractice
plaintiffs."' The absence of statutory caps will enable them to be
plaintiffs, is in fact only applied to those unfortunate plaintiffs who have endured pain and
suffering sufficient to justify a jury in awarding noneconomic damages of over $250,000. As-
suming even a loose correlation between the size of an award and the degree of injury, it is
indeed a sad irony that those most injured as a result of negligent medical care must bear the
burden of the cap, thereby theoretically ensuring available medical care for all. The statute
was upheld, however, against equal protection and due process challenges in Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
168. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
169. F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physician's Point of View Concerning Medical Malprac-
tice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of Tort Reform, 23 GA. L. REV.
295, 296 (1989).
170. "A January 1991 report by Jury Verdict Research, Inc. showed that of the 423
medical malpractice awards reported to the service in 1989, 107 or 25 percent totaled $1 mil-
lion or more." See Gastel, supra note 3, at 1.
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compensated for their pain and suffering to the extent determined to
be just and fair by a jury of their peers.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the citizens of Califor-
nia will benefit from the invalidation of the legislature's attempt to
remedy a perceived problem by the rolling back of individual liber-
ties. While it is not disputed that the state has a strong interest in
the maintenance of effective and affordable health care, the zealous
pursuit of such an interest cannot be tolerated if achieved at the ex-
pense of cherished individual rights. The preservation of liberties
such as the right to trial by jury is significant not only to medical
malpractice plaintiffs, but to unknown future litigants who might
have otherwise been subject to similar governmental infringements.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The California Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Recovery in
Medical Malpractice Claims
Section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code1"1 limits the amount
a medical malpractice plaintiff may recover for noneconomic injuries
to $250,000.17 An award of noneconomic damages has traditionally
served as a means of compensating the plaintiff for pain, suffering,
disfigurement, loss of consortium, inconvenience and other nonpecu-
niary losses. While these injuries may be difficult to quantify or
value, they are nonetheless real injuries suffered by plaintiffs as the
result of a defendant's lack of care. The difficulty in assessing the
proper amount of recovery for a plaintiff's pain and suffering does
not minimize the damage suffered by the plaintiff or the liability
incurred by the defendant.
In medical malpractice claims, noneconomic damages are often
the primary type of injury suffered by a plaintiff. For example, a
plaintiff whose face was severely disfigured as the result of a physi-
cian's negligence will undoubtedly experience tremendous pain and
suffering as a consequence of the disfigurement. Since the disfigure-
ment is not likely to cause excessive monetary losses, as would be the
case if the plaintiff were disabled, recovery will most likely be lim-
ited to medical expenses and pain and suffering. The statutory cap
on noneconomic recovery would severely hinder such a plaintiff's
hope of being properly compensated for a lifetime of pain and suffer-
ing caused by the physician's negligence.
171. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992).
172. Id.
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The California statutory cap' functionally usurps the jury's
role in assessing noneconomic damages. Once a defendant's liability
is established, the jury as factfinder is traditionally responsible for
determining the type and extent of damages a plaintiff is entitled to
receive. 7 " The statutory cap does not stop the jury from hearing and
evaluating evidence. It also allows the jury to go through the motions
of deliberating and assessing the amount of damages which would
best serve to compensate the plaintiff for any injuries. The jury's
determination of fact is only binding, however, if its judgment does
not exceed the predetermined amount set by the legislature. The
statutory cap necessitates the reduction of noneconomic damages in
excess of $250,000 even though the jury's findings may be just and
reasonable as a matter of law. 7 5 The statute, therefore, curiously
usurps the jury's findings only in claims brought by those plaintiffs
who are most seriously injured.
B. Fein v. Permanente
The California Supreme Court in Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group"6 upheld the statutory cap against constitutional challenges.
In rejecting the plaintiff's equal protection and due process chal-
lenges, the majority did not consider the statute's impact on the
plaintiff's right to trial by jury. As will be discussed, the statute's
effect of infringing on the plaintiff's right to a jury trial makes the
statutory cap constitutionally infirm on grounds independent of
equal protection and due process. A California court would not,
therefore, be restricted by Fein in striking down the statute as an
unconstitutional denial of the right to trial by jury.
C. The State and Federal Right to a Jury Trial
Both the California Constitution7 7 and the Federal Constitu-
tion 7" protect a litigant's right to a jury trial. While the two consti-
tutions are independent, the constitutional provisions regarding the
preservation of jury trials in each constitution are similar in scope
and effect. The functions of the jury at common law in the federal
and state systems are critical in the determination of which jury
173. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992).
174. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
175. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992).
176. 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985).
177. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
178. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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functions must be protected.179
1. The California Constitution
Article I, section 16 of the California Constitution states that
"trial by jury is an inviolate right" which must be secured to all.1 80
Black's Law Dictionary defines inviolate as "intact; not violated; free
from substantial impairment." '
In interpreting the California right to a jury trial, California
courts have maintained that the state constitutional right to a jury
trial is a basic and fundamental guarantee which must be zealously
guarded.' 82
A California court of appeal in Byram v. Superior Court es-
poused that there should be a presumption in favor of a litigant's
right to a jury.' 88 Any doubt as to whether a litigant should be enti-
tled to a jury trial should be resolved in favor of allowing the party
to have the claim heard and judged by a jury of the plaintiff's
peers.' 8 ' Consequently, a California court hearing constitutional jury
challenges to the statutory cap on noneconomic recovery should begin
its analysis with the overview that the right to a jury must be "zeal-
ously" guarded, and end its analysis by resolving any doubt in favor
of a litigant's right to a jury.
The California Supreme Court has also embraced the protec-
tionist language of the Byram court. 88 In People v. Collins, the ma-
jority explained that the right to a jury trial as it existed at common
law must be preserved and may not be impinged by the legisla-
ture.' 86 The legislature may, the court reasoned, enact reasonable
regulations on the enjoyment of this right "as long as the essential
elements of trial by jury are preserved.' 87 The legislature may,
therefore, place reasonable conditions on the right to a jury trial. It
may not, however, abridge the core functions of the jury as they ex-
isted at the time the California Constitution was adopted.
In addition, the California Supreme Court in Seffert v. Los An-
179. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771
P.2d 711 (Wash. 1989).
180. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 742 (6th ed. 1990).
182. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 552 P.2d 742, 745 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1077 (1977); Byram v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (Ct. App. 1977).
183. 141 Cal. Rptr. 604, 607 (Ct. App. 1977).
184. Id.
185. Collins, 552 P.2d at 745.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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geles Transit Lines specifically concluded that the assessment of
damages was a question of fact, to be determined by the jury as
factfinder.1" Likewise, courts of other states which have addressed
the common law function of juries have generally held that the tradi-
tional common law function included the determination of dam-
ages.1" These same courts are divided, however, on the capacity of
the legislature to place conditions on the essential functions of the
jury. Fortunately, the California Supreme Court has spoken on the
matter. Under the Collins analysis, if the determination of damages
is an essential common law function of the jury, then that function
must be preserved against legislative abridgment.190 Scholars and
lawyers will undoubtedly argue over the meaning of the term "pre-
served." However, read in conjunction with the state constitution's
declaration that the right to a jury trial is inviolate,191 legislation that
fails to maintain the jury's role in determining damages should cer-
tainly be rigorously scrutinized.
Medical malpractice plaintiffs whose noneconomic damages are
determined to be in excess of $250,000 are statutorily compelled to
have the legislature, and not the jury, assess their noneconomic dam-
ages. Such a compulsion makes the jury's role for these plaintiffs
merely academic, a far cry from inviolate.
2. The Seventh Amendment
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved." '192 The Seventh Amend-
ment is not binding on the states in civil trials,19 but is coextensive
with most state constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to a
jury trial. Therefore, Seventh Amendment jurisprudence may pro-
vide a sound analogy to a state statute's impact on the state
constitution. 194
188. 364 P.2d 337, 342 (Cal. 1961).
189. See, e.g., Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 716-17 (Wash. 1989). Addition-
ally, the court specifically noted that "the jury's role in determining noneconomic damages is
perhaps even more essential." Id. at 717.
190. Collins, 552 P.2d at 745.
191. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16.
192. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
193. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 717 (Wash. 1989).
194. However, the Seventh Amendment could potentially be binding on federal courts
sitting in diversity. These federal courts must apply state substantive law, but are free to apply
federal procedural law. Therefore, if a federal court concluded that the Seventh Amendment
was procedural, it may be binding. See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has accepted the use of an historical
analysis in determining which common law jury functions must be
preserved. In Dimick, the Court reasoned that the determination of
damages was clearly a common law function of the jury.195 It subse-
quently struck down the validity of additur, which allowed the trial
court judge to supplement jury verdicts that were found inadequate
as a matter of law. The Court maintained that the determination of
damages is an issue of fact. Any modification of a jury's factual find-
ings would unequivocally usurp the constitutional role of the jury.
The court also reasoned that particular deference should be given to
a jury's verdict when the damages at issue are noneconomic. 96 This
deference stands to reason since noneconomic losses are incapable of
the precise quantification and potential miscalculation associated
with assessing pecuniary losses. The determination of noneconomic
damages is particularly suited to the jury since it alone may form a
collective opinion concerning such an imprecise measurement.
The U.S. Supreme Court recently used the Dimick analysis to
determine the role of the jury in proceedings under the Federal
Clean Water Act." 7 The Court in Tull v. United States concluded
that a defendant in an enforcement proceeding under the Act has the
right to a jury trial, but not to have the jury assess the civil pen-
alty.' 9  The Court's ruling did not, however, invalidate the Dimick
Court's rationale. The holding in Tull was specifically limited to
regulatory enforcement proceedings, and therefore does not limit the
right to a jury trial in civil actions as defined in Dimick. The consti-
tutional right to a jury trial must be preserved only to the extent that
it existed at common law. A litigant therefore has no more of a right
to have a jury assess regulatory penalties, than the litigant would
have in claims of equity. In neither instance has a jury traditionally
been guaranteed.
The United States Supreme Court's analysis is not binding on
California courts, but it provides useful guidance in determining the
traditional roles of juries. Also, legislative enactments which violate
the Seventh Amendment will undoubtedly contain characteristics
which, if found in state legislation, may signal state constitutional
infirmities.
The additur provision which was invalidated in Dimick is very
similar to California Civil Code section 3333.2, except that it works
195. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935).
196. Id. at 479 (quoting Beardmore v. Carrington, 2 Wils. 244, 248 (1764)).
197. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
198. Id. at 427.
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in reverse.'" For the same reasons that an increase in a jury's award
impinges on the traditional role of the jury, so does a mandatory
decrease. In both cases the jury's determination of fact is usurped. In
the case of additur it is usurped by the judge, and with statutory
caps it is preempted by the legislature. Such infringements are con-
stitutionally unacceptable. Therefore, California courts should find
the statutory cap on noneconomic recovery in medical malpractice
claims unconstitutional under the same analysis used by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Dimick.
D. Courts Which Have Invalidated Statutory Caps as
Unconstitutional Infringements on the Right to Trial by Jury
Three state supreme courts and one federal district court have
struck down state statutory ceilings on damage recovery as unconsti-
tutional infringements on the right to trial by jury.
The courts began their analysis of the constitutional impact of
the statutory caps on the right to a jury trial by performing an his-
torical analysis of the common law functions of juries. As the Wash-
ington Supreme Court in Sofie v. Fibreboard explained, "the scope
of the right to trial by jury may be defined by the common law
through a historical analysis, but the right itself is protected by the
state constitution. '20 0 The Washington court then reasoned that the
functions of the jury as they existed at common law must be pre-
served. One of these functions, the determination of damages, was
clearly implicated by the Washington statute which limited recovery
in all personal injury and wrongful death actions.''
The analysis by the Sofie court should be very similar to that of
a California court addressing the statutory cap's impact on the Cali-
fornia right to a jury trial. The Washington and California constitu-
tional provisions regarding the right to a jury trial both describe the
right as "inviolate.'' 2 0 2 Also, an historical analysis of the California
jury should conclude that a traditional jury function was the deter-
mination of damages, as was the case in Washington.
The Sofie court conceded that the legislature has the "power to
199. The provisions work in reverse to the extent that additur provides for the supple-
mentation of an inadequately low jury award, while the California cap on noneconomic recov-
ery serves to lower any jury award over $250,000 in medical malpractice claims. See CAL. CiV.
CoDE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1992).
200. 771 P.2d 711, 720 (Wash. 1989).
201. Id.
202. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 16; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 21.
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shape litigation. "'0 Such power, however, must give way to individ-
ual constitutional guarantees. The legislature may do away with a
particular cause of action completely as long as it provides adequate
means for an individual to redress any injuries. For example, work-
ers' compensation statutes provide for no fault worker compensation
in the place of civil suits between employers and employees. Since
the right to trial by jury exists only in the context of a trial, the right
is not violated if no trial exists. The Sofie court reasoned that since
the right to a jury is a constitutional right, it cannot be removed by
legislative action.2' "As long as the cause of action continues to exist
and the litigants have access to a jury," the court explained, "that
right of access remains as long as the cause of action does."
205
The Sofie court also distinguished the judicial practice of remit-
titur from the legislative damage cap.206 The doctrine of remittitur,
as employed in Washington, empowers the trial court to lower a
jury's award of damages. The majority went on to explain that re-
mittitur is distinct in that it is a judicial finding in light of the partic-
ular facts of the case, as opposed to a predetermined legislative limit
which happens automatically.207 Also, a trial judge may implement
remittitur only in accord with established constitutional guidelines.
The judge must honor the strong presumption in favor of a jury's
determination of damages, and may upset that finding only upon the
conclusion that the verdict is "wholly unsupported by the evidence,
obviously motivated by passion or prejudice, or shocking to the
court's conscience. 0 Finally, the court explained that the party
against whom remittitur is levied has the choice of accepting the re-
duction or opting for a new trial. 20 9
Legislative and judicial measures designed to shape causes of
action, such as workers' compensation and remittitur, do not necessa-
rily violate the right to a jury trial. The right is preserved and held
inviolate only to the extent that it existed at common law. Clearly,
the right to trial by jury at common law could not have been success-
fully asserted where no trial existed or where the jury had ignored
rules of law. The California statutory cap on noneconomic recovery,
however, far exceeds the legitimate power of the legislature to shape
203. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 719.
204. Id. at 720.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 720-22.
208. Sofie, 771 P.2d at 721.
209. Id.
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causes of action. The cap substitutes findings of fact made by juries
with predetermined legislative findings.
As the Utah Supreme Court in Condemarin v. University Hos-
pital explained, arbitrary legislative ceilings on damages awarded by
juries "seriously infringes" upon the right to trial by jury."1" The
Texas Supreme Court in Lucas v. United States embraced the anal-
ysis of the Utah and Washington courts, and invalidated the Texas
limitation on noneconomic recovery in malpractice claims.2" It rea-
soned that for the right of access to a trial by jury to have any mean-
ing, the jury must be allowed to determine damages without the sub-
sequent imposition of an arbitrary cap.2" 2
The federal district court's analysis in Boyd v. Bulala2" 3 is also
helpful in assessing the constitutionality of California's statutory cap.
The Boyd court struck down a Virginia statutory cap for medical
malpractice claims on the theory that it violated the Virginia consti-
tutional right to a trial by jury. While exercising deference to legisla-
tive actions generally, the court held that the legislature "may not
preempt a jury's findings on a factual issue which has properly been
submitted to the jury."2 The legislature is not constitutionally'em-
powered to mandate a particular quantum of damages to be ordered
in a trial. The district judge explained that such legislative attempts
are not afforded deference since the constitutional provisions must
prevail.21" 5
The above analysis of the Supreme Courts of Washington,
Utah, Texas, and that of the federal district court in Boyd is perti-
nent to the constitutionality of the California statutory cap on
noneconomic recovery. In striking down the cap, a California court
should conduct the same type of historical analysis as was performed
by the previously mentioned courts. It should inevitably find that the
California common law function of a jury included the determination
of damages. The statutory cap should then be distinguished from le-
gitimate exercises of legislative power in shaping causes of action.
Finally, the court should conclude that the statutory cap unreasona-
bly impinges upon the protected factfinding duties of the jury and is
therefore unconstitutional.
210. Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 365-66 (Utah 1989).
211. Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988).
212. Id. at 690.
213. 647 F. Supp. 781 (W. D. Va. 1986), modified, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
214. Id. at 789-90.
215. Id.
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E. Courts Which Have Upheld Statutory Caps in the Face of Jury
Related Constitutional Arguments
Two California Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Courts of Vir-
ginia and Kansas, as well as three federal courts, have ruled that
statutory damage caps do not violate state or federal constitutional
rights to a trial by jury. All of these courts recognized that the deter-
mination of damages was a traditional function of the jury, yet they
maintained that the statutory caps were legitimate exercises of power
over causes of action.
The California Courts of Appeal in Yates v. Pollock and Jor-
dan v. Long Beach Community Hospital, held that the statutory cap
on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice claims provided for
by section 3333.2 of the California Civil Code did not abridge the
plaintiff's right to a jury trial.21 In reaching this conclusion, the
Yates court did nothing more than quote from Fein. The court's con-
stitutional analysis of the jury issue was circumscribed by the lan-
guage in Fein concluding that a legislature may limit or restrict the
amount or timing of damages provided that such a limit or restraint
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 17 Additionally, the
Jordan court simply reiterated the Yates quote from Fein, and con-
cluded without explanation that "Yates correctly states the California
law in this respect."2 8
The Yates and Jordan courts' rulings on the jury issue are mis-
conceived for several reasons. Initially, their sole reliance on Fein is
misplaced. The court in Fein no where addressed the statutory cap's
impact on the right to a jury trial. The court's constitutional analysis
was limited to due process and equal protection theories.2" Indeed,
the language from Fein regarding the broad legislative control over
damages and the simple requirement of a rational relationship
quoted by Yates and Jordan to resolve the jury issue, was written by
the Fein court in the context of a due process challenge.220
Secondly, neither the Yates nor the Jordan court discussed the
applicability of the rational relationship test to a constitutional right
to a jury trial challenge, as opposed to equal protection or due pro-
cess attacks. Unlike the due process and equal protection challenges
216. Jordan v. Long Beach Community Hosp., 248 Cal. Rptr. 651 (Ct. App. 1988)
(review denied and ordered not to be officially published (Sept. 15, 1988)); Yates v. Pollock,
239 Cal. Rptr. 383 (Ct. App. 1987).
217. Yates, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
218. Jordan, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
219. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679, 682 (Cal. 1986).
220. Id. at 680.
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to the California statutory cap, the jury trial challenge does not in-
volve the restriction of an economic right. The Fein court itself indi-
cated that the rational relationship test of a due process issue was
applicable when economic rights were involved."2 ' The Fein plain-
tiff's due process and equal protection attacks admittedly involved
economic rights to the extent that the challenges were based on the
statutory cap's impact on the amount of damages received. Such is
not the case with the constitutional right to a jury trial challenge.
The infringement of the right to a jury trial is not dependent on the
size of the plaintiff's award, but rather on the legislature's usurpa-
tion of a traditional jury function, the assessment of damages. Conse-
quently, a violation of the express constitutional right to a jury trial
should not be subject to a rational relationship test. Consistent appli-
cation of such a test unduly denigrates the constitutional right to a
jury trial to the level of no greater importance than mere economic
rights.
Finally, the Yates and Jordan courts improperly focused on the
rights and power of the legislature, rather than those of the jury.
Once it is established that the determination of damages is a tradi-
tional function of the jury, the rights and powers of the legislature
are limited. The California Supreme Court in People v. Collins un-
equivocally stated that common law functions of the jury must be
preserved against legislative abridgment.22 Consequently, the broad
powers referred to in Fein must yield to the specific right to a jury
trial.
The Supreme Court of Kansas in Samsel v. Wheeler Transport
Services maintained that a litigant does not have a vested right in
any particular cause of action.22' The legislature may therefore mod-
ify the cause of action as long as it complies with due process re-
quirements. The court proceeded to reason that due process merely
required that the legislature not act arbitrarily in pursuit of the gen-
eral welfare, and that it provide litigants an adequate quid pro quo.
The court sustained the $250,000 cap claiming that the due process
requirements were met. 2 4
The first error in the Kansas court's reasoning was its conclu-
sion that the statutory cap on damages modified a cause of action. It
is true that litigants do not have vested rights in causes of action, and
221. Id. at 679.
222. 552 P.2d 742, 745 (Cal. 1976).
223. Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Serv., 789 P.2d 541, 555 (Kan. 1990), overruled by
Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176 (Kan. 1991).
224. Id. at 558.
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that the legislature may modify them. The statutory cap on recovery,
however, does not modify the tort cause of action. It does not alter
the procedural or substantive requirements of a claim. Instead, it
merely usurps the jury's determination of damages with that of the
legislature if the jury awards more than $250,000. This is a direct
infringement on a jury's role in an existing cause of action, and is
outside the bounds of the legislature's powers.
The second error made by the Kansas court was its conclusion
that the statutory cap provided an adequate quid pro quo. The court
reasoned that the cap insured that an award of over $250,000 would
not be reduced below $250,000. Since this assurance did not exist
prior to the statute, it serves as an adequate quid pro quo. This
reasoning is faulty for many reasons. Initially, the removal of the
possibility of a lower award in exchange for the certainty of a lower
award hardly seems like a bargain. Also, the trial judge was not free
to lower the jury's verdict as desired. A trial judge may only lower a
jury's verdict in very limited circumstances. Finally, the statutory
cap limits the recovery of every plaintiff whose jury award was in
excess of $250,000, while it is unlikely that remittitur would have
been exercised in every such case. The court assumes that plaintiffs
with awards of more than $250,000 would have been in certain dan-
ger of having their awards reduced below $250,000. However, such
an assumption simply has no basis in fact.
The Virginia Supreme Court in Etheridge v. Medical Center
Hospitals' 5 and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Boyd v.
Bulala,26 upheld the Virginia statutory cap under the theory that
juries are not responsible for the legal consequences of their factual
determination of damages.2 1 7 This is true to the extent that the jury
is not involved in how damages are actually recovered. However, to
argue that a statutory cap involves only the legal consequences, and
not the factual determination of damages, makes a mockery of the
important role of the jury. For the fact finding duty of the jury to
benefit the litigants, the findings must be accorded weight and fol-
lowed. To separate the final judgment of damages from the process
of reaching it makes the traditional function of the jury nothing more
than a hollow academic enterprise with no real significance. A statu-
tory cap, therefore, must be held unconstitutional as an impermissi-
ble impairment of the jury's traditional function of determining
225. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
226. 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
227. Id. at 1195-96.
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damages.
Finally, the federal district court in Franklin v. Mazda Corp.,
reasoned that intrinsic in the legislative power to abolish complete
causes of action is the power to define by statute what damages may
be recovered.228 It is true that the legislature has the power to abol-
ish complete causes of action. However, individuals have certain con-
stitutional guarantees intertwined with existing causes of action
which cannot be abrogated by the legislature. The traditional jury
function of determining damages is not subject to legislative modifi-
cation. Although litigants may not have vested rights in particular
causes of action, they do have a vested right in having a jury hear
whatever causes of action continue to exist. 29 The Franklin court
committed a logical fallacy when it assumed that the power to deter-
mine damages was subsumed by the power to abolish causes of ac-
tion. The former is reserved for the jury, and the latter for the
legislature.
V. PROPOSAL
California Civil Code section 3333.2 should be invalidated as an
unconstitutional infringement on the state right to a jury trial. The
statute should be either legislatively repealed, or in the absence of a
legislative response, medical malpractice plaintiffs should challenge
the statutory cap as an unconstitutional infringement on their right
to a trial by jury. In addressing these claims, California courts
should follow the analysis of Sofie, Lucas, Condemarin, and Dimick,
and hold the statute unconstitutional in light of its impact on a liti-
gant's right to a jury. 0
The absence of the statutory cap will provide the legislature and
the health care sector with an opportunity to compare professional
liability costs relative to when the statutory cap was applicable. Re-
cent studies have indicated that tort reforms do not significantly
228. Franklin v. Mazda Corp., 704 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (D. Md. 1989).
229. See Condemarin v. Univ. Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 366 (Utah 1989); Sofie v.
Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 720 (Wash. 1989).
230. The Fein majority was silent as to the statutory cap's impact on the state right to a
jury trial. However, while Fein would not preclude a court from finding the statutory cap
unconstitutional, such a finding would make the Fein majority's equal protection and due
process analysis inapplicable. The majority applied a mere rational relationship test to the cap.
However, once a court determines that the cap infringes upon the fundamental right to a jury
trial, the rational relationship test would necessarily give way to a higher level of judicial
scrutiny. Applying a strict scrutiny test, it is likely that the statutory cap would also be uncon-
stitutional on equal protection and due process theories. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 486 (1934).
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lower liability costs.2 " However, if costs do rise as a result of the
cap's absence, alternate remedial steps should be considered. Among
them might be a no fault system similar to workers' compensation.
Additionally, the nature of physicians' practices could be critically
studied and evaluated with an eye toward decreasing the exorbitant
costs incurred as a result of the changes in physician practices aimed
at decreasing risk and a physician's potential liability.
However, until the legislature or another appropriate body pro-
vides an effective and constitutionally sound alternative to statutory
caps, increased professional liability costs may simply be the neces-
sary price to guarantee the free and full exercise of the right to trial
by jury.
VI. CONCLUSION
This comment addressed the California statutory cap on dam-
age awards' impact on the constitutional right to a jury trial. It dis-
cussed the medical malpractice crisis as the impetus for the damage
cap statute, and explained how the statutory cap applies equally to
all medical malpractice plaintiffs, regardless of the severity of their
injuries or the reasonableness of the jury's award. The California
and federal rights to a jury were examined using an historical analy-
sis, and it was concluded that one of the jury's functions traditionally
has been the determination of damages. The analysis and reasoning
of courts which have considered the impact of statutory caps on the
right to a jury were discussed and scrutinized. It was determined
that the courts which have invalidated the statutory caps because of
their infringement on the right to a jury trial offered sound reason-
ing supported by history. It was also concluded that the courts which
have found no impingement on the right to a jury trial as the result
of statutory caps failed to present cogent, rational justifications for
their findings. Finally, it was argued that California Civil Code sec-
tion 3333.2 should be invalidated as an unconstitutional infringe-
ment on the right to trial by jury.
Medical malpractice plaintiffs, like Michael Miller, are not be-
ing afforded the opportunity to have their claims assessed by a jury
of their peers. The legislature, which has never heard of Michael
231. Gastel, supra note 3, at 1, 8. Despite massive, widespread tort reforms designed to
lower liability costs, both the number and size of malpractice claims are increasing. Specifi-
cally, a study by the AMA indicated that defensive medicine practiced by physicians contrib-
uted nearly three times as much to spiraling health care costs than did the threat of lawsuits.
Id.
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Miller, his claim, or the nature of his injuries, has substituted its
uninformed determination of what his pain and suffering are worth,
for that of a jury which had the benefit of hearing all relevant evi-
dence. Such a usurpation of the traditional role of the jury is consti-
tutionally offensive, and must be invalidated.
Stephen K. Meyer

